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Abstract
The academic literature and popular press has chronicled large IT project failures for the last 40
years. Two points of contention surround this debate. First, quantitative studies found mixed sup-
port of a wide-spread crisis, questioning the representativeness of failure cases. Second, organiza-
tional theories disagreed on underlying assumptions about the nature of uncertainty, in particular
about stability, locus of control, and controllability of the causes of IT project disasters. To ad-
vance the understanding of these two gaps four hypotheses were tested with a sample of 4,227
IT projects. The findings showed that outliers are stable phenomena following power laws, oc-
currence and impact of outliers diﬀers between public and private sector, benefits management is
associated with thinner tails and lower risk, and agile delivery methods do not statistically signifi-
cantly influence the thickness of the tails. In sum, outliers are stable and non-random phenomena.
They matter more than medians or means when it comes to IT project risk. Second, the notion of
outliers bridges the gap between qualitative and quantitative studies. The findings also show that
causes of outliers are, at least to some extent, internal and controllable by organizations. Lastly,
the paper draws implications for organizational decision-making, learning, and risk management.
Keywords: Outlier, project failure, cost overruns, schedule delay, benefits shortfall, project risk,
risk management
1. Outliers and Projects
We cannot truly plan, because we do not understand the future – but this is not
necessarily bad news. We could plan while bearing in mind such limitations. (Taleb,
2007b, p. 157)
The academic literature is rife with accounts of large failed IT projects. Among the most no-
torious cases are for example the Denver Airport Baggage Handling System (Montealegre and
Keil, 1998), London Stock Exchange’s Taurus (Drummond, 1997), London Ambulance Service
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(Beynon-Davies, 1999), and Fox Meyer’s ERP project (Scott, 1998). Case of extreme organiza-
tional failure fascinate and attract substantial attention from journalists, politicians, and academics
alike (Lampel et al., 2009). The problem of large IT project failures has been labelled “runaway
projects” (Mahaney and Lederer, 1999; Glass, 1997), “White Elephants" (Shapira, 1997), “Black
Swans” (Flyvbjerg and Budzier, 2011), or “Black Holes" (Keil and Mähring, 2010). But how
representative are these cases for the field of IT projects?
Quantitative studies of project performance paint a slightly diﬀerent picture (cf. table 1). They
showed that the cry of a wide-spread crisis in IT project delivery is unwarranted (Glass, 2006).
Nevertheless, the surveys report a wide range of project performance. Cost overruns span on
average from -15% (Little and Graphics, 2006) to +286% (Eveleens and Verhoef, 2009). Similarly,
the reported schedule slippage ranges from -8% (Jones, 2008) to +105% (Little and Graphics,
2006). The benefits shortfall ranges on average from -7%, a benefits over-delivery (Sauer et al.,
2007), to +10% (Eveleens and Verhoef, 2009). The large variability, particularly of cost overruns,
warrants attention.
The reported cost overruns (cf. table 1) show on the one hand, that extreme failures are rare.
On the other hand, the large variability might be due to the impact of extreme failure cases on aver-
ages. Because of the low averages extreme failures are expected to be low frequency, high impact
occurrences in other words outliers. An outlier, in statisticians’ language, is an observation that:
”appears to deviate markedly from other members of the sample in which it appears” (Grubbs,
1969, p. 1). It is a subjective post-data manifestation (Barnett, 1978), which only reveals itself
after the sample has been drawn and some analysis has taken place. Therefore, outliers are an out-
come of sense-making and sense-giving to observations through statistical analysis. Outliers have
been given many labels: unrepresentative, wild, straggler, rogue, spurious, maverick, alien con-
taminants (Anscombe, 1960; Barnett, 1978). They are usually thought of as aberrant, discordant,
or anomalous observations (Anscombe, 1960; Hoaglin et al., 1986) that cause troubling distortions
in datasets (Hoaglin et al., 1986; Hoaglin and Iglewicz, 1987). It is this troubling distortion, which
might explain the variability in prior findings.
The large variability of reported means is a first indicator for the presence of outliers. A sec-
ond indicator is the discrepancy between reported means and medians. Statistical rule-of-thumb
suggests that the discrepancy between the mean and the median indicates skewness and the length
of the tails of distributions (Agresti and Finlay, 2008). Only eight of the previous studies reported
both median and mean cost overruns (cf. table 1). The discrepancies, nevertheless, indicate that
the skew in the data might be considerable. The most extreme finding reported median cost perfor-
mance of −38%, whereas the average cost performance was +286% (Eveleens and Verhoef, 2009).
A very strong indication that outliers were present. Schedule outcomes show similar patterns. The
largest reported diﬀerence is between +105% average and +79% median schedule overrun (Little
and Graphics, 2006).
The high variability in means and the discrepancy of median and means in prior studies show
that outliers are indeed a troublesome problem in studies of quantitative IT project performance.
This observation is in line with Kitchenham and Pickard (1987), who found that the problem of
outliers is often overlooked in software productivity studies. For instance, data used in estimating
eﬀort and cycle times in software development are not only positively skewed but also highly prob-
lematic because of outliers (Kitchenham and Pickard, 1987; Raﬀo and Kellner, 2000; MacDonell
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Table 1: Quantitative Studies of Project Performance
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and Shepperd, 2003).
Only few prior studies report medians and averages, even fewer quantify the occurrence of
outliers. In these five studies outlier occurrences ranged from 33% (Kulk, 2009), 10% in Yoon
et al. (2007), 2-5% (Mitchell and Zmud, 1999; Banker and Kauﬀman, 1991), to as low as 0.2%
(Grant et al., 2006). Under the assumption of thin tails, for instance in a normal distribution,
outliers would be expected to occur in less than 0.07% of all cases in both ends of the tail (Tukey,
1977; McGill et al., 1978). These studies challenge the thin-tail assumption. At the same time the
33% outlier rate reported by Kulk (2009) is extremely high.
Four conventional strategies exist to deal with outliers: rejection, accommodation, incorpora-
tion, and identification (Barnett, 1978).
Rejection is the most common method to deal with outliers. This holds true for project man-
agement studies, most academic studies simply exclude outliers, e.g., Ahmed et al. (2013); Kulk
(2009); Trendowicz et al. (2006); Yoon et al. (2007); Grant et al. (2006); Barros et al. (2004); Ruhe
et al. (2003); Banker and Kauﬀman (1991); Andersen (1990); Mitchell and Zmud (1999).
Only few studies argue that “an outlier is not to be thrown out (due to its unusualness) but rather
might be the clue to data behaviors that are not revealed by the rest of the information.” (Steele and
Huber, 2004, p. PM21.3). Accommodation means that the inferences are made by adjusting the
method with which the data is analyzed and interpreted. One example of accommodating outliers
is to use median instead of averages to describe centrality and inter-quartile ranges instead of
standard deviation to describe variability or to log-transform variables prior to regression analyses
(an example is Eveleens and Verhoef, 2009).
Incorporation replaces the underlying assumption of thin tails with a new model that brings
the outliers back into the expected range of observations. This strategy is found predominantly
in operations management. Scheduling studies, particularly studies advancing the PERT method,
abandon the model of thin-tailed distributions and replace it with fat tail models, most often log-
normal, beta or Weibull distributions (Hahn, 2008; Chapman and Ward, 2003; Keefer and Bodily,
1983; Abdelkader, 2004). Less common are other distributions such as triangular (Williams, 1992;
Johnson, 1997; MacCrimmon and Ryavec, 1964), exponential (Kulkarni and Adlakha, 1986), or
polynomial (Schmidt and Grossmann, 2000).
Identification, the final strategy, makes inferences while treating outliers as their own self-
contained group. For example, MacDonell and Shepperd (2003) first classify outliers through
n-means clustering and then make inferences about outliers as a special subgroup of the sample.
An alternative approach to clustering is to forecast outliers through neural networks (Finnie et al.,
1997).
In sum, prior studies of large IT project failure cases established the existence of low fre-
quency high impact events. Quantitative studies of IT project performance have debunked the
alarmist claims of a crisis in IT project management. They show that, if any, high impact events
occurred with a low frequency. Nevertheless, the reported cost, schedule, and benefit performance
show a large amount of variability. Moreover, the studies reported discrepancies between median
and means. Both, variability and discrepancy, are indicators for outliers. Outliers are defined as
observations that markedly deviate from the sample. Outliers are problematic not only in the field
of IT project management, but in management in general. However, only few prior studies report
the rate of outliers. Four basic strategies exist to deal with outliers: rejection, accommodation,
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incorporation, and identification. Prior studies show that outlier rejection is the most common
choice.
The gap between qualitative studies, with thick descriptions and root cause analyses of no-
torious IT project failures, and between quantitative studies of IT project performance is not
purely academic. In practice, the extreme impact of outliers also isolates those individual in-
stances (Roux-Dufort, 2007). Rare events in organization are typically portrayed by managers
as unique, unprecedented, or even uncategorizable (Christianson et al., 2008). Outliers are often
treated as “accidental manifestations of underlying organizational processes” (Lampel et al., 2009,
p. 835). In hindsight, they are often declared to have been experiments all along, which prevents
organizational learning and improvements (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). Additionally, labeling
an event a ’perfect storm’ or a ’Black Swan’ has been criticized for implying that the event is un-
controllable and that, because nothing can be done about it, nothing is done to prevent or manage
the risks of rare events (Paté-Cornell, 2012).
Lastly, the theoretical and practical importance of the gap between qualitative and quantita-
tive studies is not purely phenomenological. Organisational theory points towards fundamentally
diﬀerent understandings of the nature and causes of uncertainty.
2. Organizational Theories of Outliers
Three schools of thought of organizational theory have theorized outliers: the system-, event-,
and process-centric view. Each school diﬀers in their understanding and assumption about the
nature and causes of uncertainty.
The system-centric school of thought depicts outliers as normal accidents (Perrow, 1981). Nor-
mal Accident Theory postulates that high system complexity, in terms of interactive complexity
and tight coupling, inevitably leads to system failures. These failures are often wrongly attributed
to operator error but their true root causes lie in organizational and technical design choices that
pre-date the operational phase of these systems (Perrow, 1981, 1984, 2004; Weick, 2004).
The second school of thought is the event-centric view. These theories view organizational
failure as the result of the occurrence of an external event followed by an insuﬃcient response
(Lampel et al., 2009; Starbuck, 2009; Rerup, 2009; Quarantelli, 1988). Dominant among this
view is the rich literature on crisis management (c.f. reviews by Quarantelli, 1988; Roux-Dufort,
2007; Weick, 1988; Boin, 2004), which also has found its way into the discussion of IT project
management (for example Angell and Smithson, 1990; Brown et al., 1998; Chartier et al., 2010).
The third school of thought is the process-centric view, where organizational failure is the re-
sult of a slow build-up of smaller errors over time. Three prominent process models exist. First, the
man-made disaster model argues that technical errors are miscommunicated or misunderstood and
thus allowed to build-up over time. At the end of this incubation period small errors have amplified
into large disaster (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). The second model describes how the organizational
and cultural process of risk managements leads to a normalization of deviance (Vaughan, 1996,
1997). Over time, the circle of accepted risks slowly enlarges. The third process model is the es-
calation of commitment. In this model locally rational decision cause an organization to persevere
on a dysfunctional course of action despite negative feedback (Staw and Ross, 1986; Staw, 1981;
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Staw and Ross, 1989; Drummond, 1997; Keil et al., 1994, 2000). In all three process models the
true causes of the organizational failure remain hidden to the organization until after fact.
Each school of thought developed diﬀerent core concepts to describe outliers, in particular
accidents, crises, and disasters. The communality between these conceptualizations is that the
future does not go according to plan. The future either holds unintended consequences of social
action (Merton, 1936) or “intendedly rational action fails” outright (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, p.
6). In the system-centric view, the failures is with the intention of designing a safe, highly reliable
system (Perrow, 1981; Weick and Sutcliﬀe, 2007). In the event-centric view, the intention to be
resilient and prepared, if an unforeseen event occurs, fails (Roux-Dufort, 2007; Starbuck, 2009).
In the process-centric view, the organizational decision making and risk mitigation actions have
unintended negative consequences (Vaughan, 1997; Staw and Ross, 1986).
The three diﬀerent schools of thought point to a more profound diﬀerence. Each makes funda-
mentally diﬀerent assumptions about the future and the nature of uncertainty. The diﬀerences can
be unpacked using the multi-dimensional model of spontaneous causal thinking (Weiner, 1985).
The model groups assumptions about causes in three dimensions. The first dimension is stability:
Are cause-eﬀect relationships stable? The second dimension is locus of control: Are causes of
outliers internal or external to the organization? The third dimension is control, also referred to
as controllability: Are causes of outliers influenced by the organization? (Weiner et al., 1976;
Weiner, 1985, 2008).
Table 2 unpacks the assumptions made by the three diﬀerent schools of thought in organiza-
tional theory. First, the system-centric and process-centric view see the cause-eﬀect relationship
as stable. Normal Accident Theory, for example, postulates that high complexity inevitably causes
outliers (Perrow, 1984). The escalation of commitment shows how diﬃcult it is to pull the plug on
a failing outlier (Keil, 1995). Conversely, the event-centric view describes the causes of outliers
as unique, idiosyncratic, and not equivalent (Christianson et al., 2008).
Second, the system-centric view and the process-centric view locate the cause of outliers
within the organization, in complex designs or dysfunctional organizational processes (Vaughan,
1997; Staw and Ross, 1986). The event-centric view locates it external to the organization (Chris-
tianson et al., 2008).
Lastly, the system-centric view sees the causes of outliers as controllable, they are unintended
consequences of design decisions (Perrow, 1984; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) and can be prevented
by mindful attention to early warning signs (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; Weick and Sutcliﬀe,
2006). Whereas the event-centric view argues they are uncontrollable external occurrences (Pear-
son and Clair, 1998) and the process-view portrays the causes as dysfunctional but rational out-
come of local action (Vaughan, 1997; Staw and Ross, 1986).
3. Research questions
This paper sets out two goals: (1) bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative research
in large failures of (IT) projects and (2) bridge the gap between the three theoretical schools of
thought. Following a multi-dimensional model of spontaneous causal thinking questions arise that
inquire into the diﬀerent assumptions about the nature and the causes of uncertainty. The first
question is: Are outliers a stable phenomenon?
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Table 2: Diﬀerences between system-, event-, process-centric views
System-centric Event-centric Process-centric
Intention Safe design Resilience Robustness
Assumptions
- Stability Stable Unstable Stable
- Locus Internal External Internal
- Control Yes No No
Implications (Design) decisions Planning & Response Practice & behavior
If outliers are not a stable phenomenon they manifest because of random chance events. A
conceptualization that is supported by the event-centric view. The opposing conceptualization,
held by the process- and system-centric view, is that outliers are not idiosyncratic, but that outliers
are a stable phenomenon. In statistical terms, the problem translates into question whether outliers
are from a diﬀerent population of uncertainty than the rest of the sample. If this were the case, the
appropriate strategy is to reject and exclude the outliers. If this is not the case, then outliers are
stable extrapolations of smaller overruns: they are from the same population of risk albeit from a
diﬀerent position in the spectrum.
Hypothesis 1: Outliers are from a diﬀerent population of uncertainty than smaller
failures.
The second question is whether the causes of outliers are internal or external to the organization.
The third question asks whether the causes are controllable or not. Theories from the event-centric
view argue that the causes and trigger events are external and uncontrollable. They are chance
events that occur and require a response. The process-centric view locates the causes internal but
not controllable, because the organization is blind to slow processes that build-up risk or is unable
to stop a failing course of action despite receiving negative feedback. The system-centric view
also locates the causes internally but views them as controllable through choices of organizational
and technological design.
To test these questions three organizational parameters have been chosen that are internal to
the organization but have a varying degree of controllability: public versus private sector, whether
benefits were quantified, and whether an agile project method was used.
First, empirical studies that compare the between the public and the private sector identify
three characteristics how both sectors diﬀer. Public sector organizations are more bureaucratic,
public manager are less materialistic, and public sector managers have a weaker organizational
commitment (Boyne, 2002). Others have noted diﬀerent incentive structures and that the private
sector tends to have more complex goals which subsequently are more diﬃcult to quantify (Rainey
et al., 1976). Others argued that both sectors are culturally diﬀerent, for instance that the public
sector makes more risk averse decisions (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). Lastly, some scholars
argued that public projects are more political (Pitsis et al., 2003). In sum, while diﬀerences be-
tween the public and the private sector exist, they tend to be structural and cultural, no discussion
could be found that shows that public and private sector projects diﬀer in how they are managed
and executed or diﬀer in management function and processes. In terms of controllability, it can
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be argued that the sector setting is invariant to project management decisions. In other words, the
organization has little control over the sector it operates in. Even if there would be none but a
cultural diﬀerence, changing the public culture it is a diﬃcult long-term process (Fernandez and
Rainey, 2006) and attempts such as public-private partnerships have had mixed success (Goldberg,
2006).
Hypothesis 2: Outliers are diﬀer between the public versus private sector.
Second, benefits management is an under-researched topic (Cooke-Davies, 2002, p. 186), yet an
important practice. Benefits management is the umbrella of a wide variety of activities, including
measurement and modeling of benefits, as well as planning and management activities to harvest
benefits (Morris, 2004). Sauer et al. (2009, p. 5) describe benefits management as «...understand-
ing exactly what the project is trying to achieve in terms of business benefits, what it’s trying to
deliver.» They point out that it is a planning activity that is typically carried out in the front-end
planning process and is the extension of business strategy into project management (Sauer et al.,
2009). Cooke-Davies’ analysis shows that if a benefits management process is present in organi-
zations the chances of success improve (Cooke-Davies, 2000, 2002). Although important, benefits
quantification is diﬃcult in practice. Not all projects that theoretically could quantify and man-
age benefits actually do so (Ward et al., 2007). Nevertheless, it can be argued that the decision
to quantify and manage benefits is controllable by the organization and to some extent under the
influence of a project’s management team.
Hypothesis 3: Outliers are associated with benefits management.
Thirdly, agile project delivery is an organizational practice related to how the project delivers
its functionality. IT projects have been at the forefront of agile practices (Geraldi et al., 2008).
The key objective of agile methods is to react to change by focussing on creativity and problem-
solving rather than focussing management attention on deterministic engineering processes (Dyba
and Dingsoyr, 2008). It has been argued that agile methods improve project performance and thus
reduce the risks of IT projects (Opelt et al., 2013). Dyba and Dingsoyr (2008) review the academic
literature and find that of 1,996 published articles only 33 present empirical evidence. Not only
does little empirical evidence exist it is also inconclusive regarding commonly made claims by the
agile practitioner community (Dyba and Dingsoyr, 2008, pp. 851-853). Nevertheless, the project
is in control over the decision to adopt an agile development method.
Hypothesis 4 Outliers are associated with agile methodology.
4. Data and Methodology
This study collected data on estimated and actual cost and schedule of 4,227 projects. The
project estimate is defined as the cost, schedule, and benefits baseline at the date of the decision
to build. The date of the decision to build was probed to be the full business case, typically the
basis of a top management decision to begin tendering for implementation partners. Estimated
project size and duration is defined as the total forecasted project budget, from the owner’s not
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the supplier’s perspective. Actual data is defined as the final reported project cost, schedule, and
benefits achieved of the project.
These data were collected from documentary evidence through 4 key channels: (1) project
archaeology, (2) desk study, (3) freedom of information requests, and (4) budgeting data. First,
the data of 1,299 projects were collected from 27 organizations; those organizations volunteered
to take part in this study and the data collection asked organizations to provide 20-30 of their
recently finished projects. Second, a desk study of audit reports and reliable academic studies
collected data on 275 projects from 37 organizations. Third, freedom-of-information requests
were used to collect data on 1,029 projects from 58 organizations in the American public sector.
Fourth, the data from recent budget requests was obtained from the U.S. Oﬃce of Management
and Budget; this yielded another 1,624 projects from 120 organizations.
3,605 projects had a reliable cost baseline and reliable actual outturn cost. For only 944
projects we established a reliable schedule baseline and actual schedule.
The projects are comparatively large. The average planned project budget is USD 24.6 million
(in 2010 terms), the median planned size is USD 1.2 million. The actual project costs were on
average USD 21.3 million, with a median actual cost of USD 1.2 million. The total actual value
of the sample is USD 85.0 billion. The average estimated duration of the projects in the sample
is 280 days; median duration is 182 days. The average actual duration of the projects is 309 days
with a median of 207 days.
The projects span a wide field of activities. Most are system implementation (89.9%), fol-
lowed by IT infrastructure (5.4%), communication technology (2.7%), IT architecture (0.5%), and
others (1.4%), which includes among others IT post merger-management, IT outsourcing. The
most common system types among the implementation projects are supply chain management
systems (26.9%), enterprise resource planning system (19.7%), human resource management sys-
tems (9.5%), and management information systems (4.9%).
5. Analysis and Discussion
Table 3 shows the project performance. Median cost overrun, schedule overrun, and benefit
shortfall are ±0.00%. The averages diﬀer quite widely from the median. The average cost overrun
is +107.2%, the average schedule overrun is +37.3%, the average benefits shortfall is 29.3%. This
finding is noteworthy for three reasons. First, the average cost overrun is in line with previously
reported findings (e.g., Eveleens and Verhoef, 2009; Jenkins et al., 1984; Keil and Mähring, 2010;
Little and Graphics, 2006). Nevertheless the median of ±0% is surprising. On the one hand, it is in
line with findings by Little and Graphics (2006); Eveleens and Verhoef (2009). On the other hand,
the diﬀerence between the mean and the median is considerable. A magnitude previously found
only in one of the three organizations surveyed by Eveleens and Verhoef (2009). Secondly, the
schedule overrun is in line with findings in Sauer and Cuthbertson (2003); Jenkins et al. (1984);
Augustine (1982); Keil and Mähring (2010). Thirdly, the benefits shortfalls are slightly greater
than the reported figure in Eveleens and Verhoef (2009). Again, the diﬀerence between mean and
median schedule and benefits performance is a clear indication that considerable skew might be
present in the data.
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The conventional definition is that outliers are 1.5 inter-quartile ranges away from the edge of
the box in a box plot (Tukey, 1977). Thus outliers are observations with a cost overrun greater
than +105.9% and a schedule delay of more than +90.0% (cf. table 4). Data on benefits is very
sparse, but the few projects indicate that a shortfall of -149.1% or more signifies an outlier. Benefit
shortfalls of more than 100% are possible, if, for instance, a project is planned to reduce operations
expenditures through replacing a legacy system but the actual running cost of the replacement are
higher than the running cost of the legacy system. In total, 12.8% of the projects are classified as
cost overrun outliers and 12.6% as schedule overrun outliers (cf. table 4).
Table 3: Project Outcomes
Mean Median IQR n
Cost overruns +107.2% ±0.0% 0.458 3,650
Schedule overruns +37.3% ±0.0% 0.360 946
Benefits shortfalls -29.3% ±0.0% 0.994 64
Eﬀort overruns +119.8% +24.8% 1.143 142
Table 4: Thresholds and Outlier Rates
Cost Schedule Benefits
Upper whisker +105.9% +90.0% -149.1%
Absolute frequency
of outliers in the
right tail
466 119 1
n 3650 946 64
Relative frequency
of outliers in the
right tail
12.8% 12.6% 1.6%
Hypothesis 1: Outliers are from a diﬀerent population of uncertainty than smaller failures.
The first null-hypothesis states that large overruns are not from a diﬀerent population of un-
certainty than smaller overruns. To test the first hypothesis the tail of the distribution needs to
be analyzed (Mandelbrot, 1960, 1963; Fama, 1965). Outliers are not outliers if the observed, de-
viant values can be fitted by a fat tailed distribution (Pisarenko and Sornette, 2003). A common
family of extreme value distributions are power laws or pareto distributions. Power laws were
initially discovered by geographers describing city sizes (Auerbach, 1913) and later first used by
Economists to study the concentration of wealth (Pareto, 1964). Power laws are commonly found
in physics, biology, and social sciences (reviews for example in Clauset et al., 2000; Virkar and
Clauset, 2012; Mitzenmacher, 2001), for instance in word frequency, citations of academic papers,
visits to a website, or the magnitude of earthquakes (Newman, 2005). Power laws were introduced
into organizational studies to explain the size distribution of business firms (Simon and Bonini,
1958).
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A random variable is said to have a power law distribution if Pr[X ≥ x] ∼ cx−α. The exponent
α represent the fatness of the tails of the distribution. The smaller the power law exponent the
higher the impact of outliers on the center of the distribution (Taleb, 2007b,a).
The most unbiased estimator of power laws is the Maximum Likelihood estimator (Clauset
et al., 2000; Goldstein et al., 2004). The cumulative density function is defined as F(X) = 1 −￿
xm
x
￿α
for x ∈ [xm,∞). If xm = 1 it follows that for x > 1 the probability density function simplifies
to f (x) = αxα+1 . The log-likelihood function of the distribution is l(α) = log(L(α)) = n · log(α)− (α+
1)
￿
log(xi). Maximizing the log-likelihood ∂l∂α =
n
α −
￿
log(xi)
!
= 0 gives the parameter estimator
αˆ = n￿ log(xi) .
First, taking all projects with a positive cost overrun and excluding missing values results in
1,631 observations in the right tail of the distribution. Second, the Q-Q plots of the normal dis-
tribution and common extreme value distributions (cf. figure 1) confirm that a Pareto distribution
is the most suitable fit. If the empirical distribution corresponds to a theoretical distribution the
points of the Q-Q plot resemble a straight line, whose slope is influenced by the fitted parameters
(Karian and Dudewicz, 2010). Even if not a perfect 45 degree angle, only the Q-Q plot for a pareto
distribution resembles a straight line. This indicates the suitability of fitting a power law. Third,
computing the estimator αˆ = n￿ log(xi) results in αˆ = 1.609759.
The result shows, that the cost overruns of IT projects have fat tails. Because the estimated
exponent is between 1 and 2, the distribution has an expectancy value but does not converge for
higher order moments such as variance, skewness, and kurtosis. Thus, the distribution is fat tailed
but not heavy tailed.
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Figure 1: Q-Q Plots for normal distribution and common extreme value distributions
The observation of fat tails is commonly challenged by two alternative explanations (Fama,
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1965). First, fat tails can be the spurious result of mixing normal distributions with the same
mean and a diﬀerent variance structure. Secondly, fat tails can be the spurious result of mixing
observations over a non-stationary parameter.
To test the first alternative explanation the subsample is split by project type. Figure 2 shows
the Q-Q plot for the power law distribution for ERP projects, SCM projects, and IT infrastructure
projects. All three subsamples show the presence of fat tails.
Figure 2: Q-Q Power Law Plot for Diﬀerent Project Types
The second alternative explanations is that fat tails are an outcome of non-stationary parame-
ters. For instance, in the analysis of stock market prices fat tails appear if the risk of the company
changes over time. In the context of project management, fat tails could be caused by changes
in project performance that come from changes in the organization. In other words changes of
the underlying generating processes. To test the second alternative explanation we analyzed the
project portfolio of one participating private sector organization. This organization conducted a
transformation of their IT department during the data collection. In 2011 the organization experi-
enced a median cost overrun of +13% with an IQR of 3.751. In 2012 the median cost overrun was
reduced to -0.7% with an IQR of 0.512. The diﬀerence is nearly significant at p = 0.061 (using
a non-parametric Wilcoxon test). Thus the underlying performance has changed. So did pooling
the data prior and post this organizational change create spuriously fat tails? The 2011 and 2012
Q-Q plots both indicate the presence of fat tails (cf. figure 3).
Both alternative explanations failed to make the potentially spurious fat tails disappear. Thus
the finding supports the conclusion that the observed fat tails are neither an artifact of aggregating
normal distributions with same means but diﬀerent variances nor of aggregating outcomes across
non-stationary parameters.
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Figure 3: Q-Q Plot before and after Reorganization
In sum, the analysis of the first hypothesis validated that the data is far from being normally
distributed. The tails of the distribution are fatter than log-normal or Weibull tails, which are
both distributions commonly used to incorporate outliers. The tail can be fitted with a Pareto
distribution, with a shape parameter of 1.6. Two common alternative explanations fail to account
for the fat tails. First, fat tails can be an artifact of mixing normal, thin-tailed distributions with
the same mean and diﬀerent variance structures. Q-Q plots show that subsamples of diﬀerent
project types all show similar fat tails. Second, fat tails can be an artifact of mixing thin-tailed
distributions over time, when an underlying parameter changes. The portfolio of one participating
organization shows, that despite improvements in project delivery after a reorganization of the IT
department, fat tails are continuously present. Again, the alternative explanation demonstrates that
fat tails are a stable phenomenon. The fat tails are not an artifact from aggregating performance
over non-stationary parameters. Thus the analysis can reject hypothesis one that outliers are from
a diﬀerent population of uncertainty.
Hypothesis 2: Outliers are diﬀer between the public versus private sector
Hypotheses 2-4 question whether the organization can influence the risk of outliers. The test
strategy for these hypotheses is three-fold.
First, a Q-Q plot is used to visually confirm the suitability of power laws to describe the sub-
samples indicated by the hypothesis. Second, a likelihood ratio test assesses whether a model with
two subgroups is significantly better than a model for the pooled distribution. A model with more
parameters, in the case of two subgroups with two shape parameters instead of one, will always
fit better. The likelihood ratio test answers the question whether a model then is significantly bet-
ter. The likelihood ratio test statistic D is defined as D = 2(log(likelihood alternativemodel) −
2(log(likelihood null model). The null hypothesis states that the pooled model oﬀers the better
fit of the distribution. If H0 can not be rejected the sample should not be split into subgroups.
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In the case of the alternative model being a two subgroup model and the null model being the
pooled sample D is D = 2
￿
n1log(α1) − (α1 + 1)￿ log (x1) + n2log(α2) − (α2 + 1)￿ log (x2)￿ −
2(n1 + n2)log(α) + (α + 1)
￿
log (x), with n1 and n2 the sizes of the two subsamples, and the
total sample size of n = n1 + n2. D is approximately χ2 distributed with degrees of freedom equal
to d f (alternativemodel) − d f (null model). In the case where H0 compares a two subsamples
model with a model of one sample d f = 2. Third, the diﬀerence of shape parameters is tested.
The null hypothesis states that the shape parameters in both groups are equal: H0 : α1 = α2.
The maximum likelihood estimator used to estimate α from the data is asymptotically normal dis-
tributed. Thus under H0 the diﬀerence between the estimators is normally distributed around 0
with αˆ1 − αˆ2∼˙N
￿
0, α1n1 +
α2
n2
￿
. The diﬀerence can be standardized so that the resulting test statistic
z is N(0, 1) distributed: z = αˆ1−αˆ2￿
α21
n1
+
α22
n2
∼˙N(0, 1).
Hypothesis 2 asks whether outliers are associated with the organization’s sector. An important
cultural context of projects, which is diﬃcult to control. First, a Q-Q plot confirms that a Pareto
distribution is appropriate for the private and the public sector subsample (cf. figure 4). Splitting
the tails of the distribution results in two subsamples with nPrivate = 368 and nPublic = 1, 263. The
empirical average cost overrun of the subsamples is +93.3% in the private sector and +111.6%
in the public sector. The medians are ±0% in both cases. The respective IQRs are 0.323 and
0.554. While both sectors have the same median the variation in the public sector is greater than
in the private sector. Moreover, the higher average cost overrun in the public sector indicates a
stronger influence of outliers. The estimated distributional parameters are αˆPrivate = 2.003 and
αˆPublic = 1.523. The greater alpha estimate in the private sector shows that the tails in the private
sector are thinner than in the public sector. The expectancy value αα−1 , for the private sector is
+99.7% for the public sector it is +191.4%. Thus if a project escalates, i.e., overruns its budget,
the cost are expect to nearly double in the private sector to nearly triple in the public sector. A
finding that is in line with the escalated projects reported by Keil and Mann (1997).
Secondly, the likelihood ratio tests the the null-model of the pooled sample against the alter-
native model of splitting the sample between the public and the private sector. The likelihood ratio
test is statistically significant (D = 20.380, one-tailed χ2 test, p < 0.001).
Thirdly, the standardized diﬀerence between the maximum likelihood estimators is z = αˆ1−αˆ2￿
α21
n1
+
α22
n2
=
4.259. The test value z is asymptotically normally distributed with p < 0.001.
Replicating the analysis for schedule overruns, results in an estimated αˆPrivate = 2.107 and
αˆPublic = 2.361. The much smaller diﬀerence in the thickness of the tails results in a likelihood
ratio between the split and the pooled model of D = 0.250, which corresponds to a p = 0.882.
Similarly the standardized diﬀerence between the estimators has a test value of z = 0.483, which
corresponds to p = 0.629.
Thus the public and the private sector have statistically significantly diﬀerent tails when it
comes to cost performance of their projects, but not in terms of schedule performance.
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Figure 4: Q-Q plot sector comparison
(a) Cost overruns
(b) Schedule overruns
Hypothesis 3: Outliers are associated with benefits management
The third and fourth hypotheses test whether, organizational practices are associated with the
fatness of tails. Hypothesis three inquires into benefits management, a project practice often prob-
lematized in the literature. To test the eﬀect of this practice, the sample is split between projects
that measured benefits and projects that did not measure benefits. This results in two sub samples
with 25 and 1,606 projects respectively. The number is noteworthy, as only 25 projects that mea-
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sured benefits had a cost overrun. Both subsamples show fat tails that might be fitted with a pareto
distribution (cf. figure 5).
The maximum likelihood estimator for the shape parameters are αˆBene f its measured = 2.619729
and αˆBene f its not measured = 1.600156. The likelihood ratio test is nearly significant, thus providing
some statistical evidence that the alternative model of splitting the sample into two subsamples
is statistically significantly better than the null model of a pooled sample ( D = 5.130699, one-
tailed χ2-test, p = 0.077). The standardized diﬀerence between the two shape parameters is
z = 1.940325, which corresponds to p = 0.052. Because only 12 reliable data points of schedule
overruns are available for projects that measured benefits, a reliable replication of this analysis for
schedule performance is not feasible.
However, despite the very small sample size, the analysis oﬀers some statistical evidence to the
hypothesis that benefits management, an organizational practice, is associated with the thickness
of the tails.
Figure 5: Q-Q plot benefits measurement
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Hypothesis 4: Outliers are associated with agile methodology
The fourth hypothesis analyzes whether the delivery method has an influence on the thickness
of the tails. Delivery methods are often the choice of the project management team. Agile devel-
opment methods have been suggested to improve project performance and thus reduce the risks of
projects (for example Dyba and Dingsoyr, 2008; Blunden, 2010; Tengshe and Noble, 2007; Opelt
et al., 2013). The subgroups tested by this hypothesis are formed based on information provided
by the project manager about the project. One question in the post mortem questionnaire, used in
the data collection, asked whether the project was delivered incrementally or as a big bang. The
scale from 1-10 was anchored as follows:
• Q4 The project followed an incremental approach.
– (1) The project was a classic Big-Bang
– (4) The project is done in a few big releases
– (7) The project is done in multiple, short (<6 months) release cycles
– (10) The project was highly agile and iterative
199 projects answered the question, of those cost performance data was reliably available for
147 projects. 9 of these 147 projects turned into outliers based on the IQR definition. The me-
dian answer to the question was 7. The median was used to split the sample into two groups of
projects: those with less agile methodologies, projects who answered 1-7, and those with more
agile methodologies, projects that were scored 8-10 by their project managers in the post-mortem
questionnaire.
Table 5 shows the project performance of both subgroups. Non-parametricWilcox tests showed
that both subgroups do not significantly diﬀer in their median cost, schedule, or benefits perfor-
mance.
Table 5: More agile versus less agile projects
Dimension Less agile More agile p-value
Cost
Median ±0.0% ±0.0%
0.8315
.
Mean +13.2% +18.1% .
Schedule
Median +14.3% +3.7%
0.2643
.
Mean +45.0% +27.2% .
Benefits
Median ±0.0% -98.8%
0.1146
.
Mean -13.6% -77.5% .
n 131 61
The Q-Q plots for both subgroups (cf. figure 6) confirmed the suitability of fitting a pareto
distribution. Fitting the tail results in the estimate of αˆLess agile = 3.72 and αˆMore agile = 2.70.
The comparison between the two nested models has a likelihood ratio of D = 1.474, which is
approximately χ2 distributed with 2 degrees of freedom, which corresponds to p = 0.478. The
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result does not support splitting the model into two models for each subgroups. The final step
tests whether the shape parameters of the two groups are significantly diﬀerent. The test statistic
z = 1.2263 corresponds to a p = 0.220, again the test can not reject the null hypothesis and oﬀers
no support that the shape parameters are significantly diﬀerent.
Figure 6: Pareto Q-Q plot distribution of agile projects
(a) Cost overruns
(b) Schedule overruns
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Replicating the same analysis for the schedule performance results inML estimates of αˆLess agile =
1.93 and αˆMore agile = 3.05. The comparison between the two nested models has a likelihood ratio
of D = 1.915, which is approximately χ2 distributed with 2 degrees of freedom, which corre-
sponds to p = 0.384. The result does not support splitting the model into two models for each
subgroups. Testing the standardized diﬀerence of the shape parameters yields the test statistic
z = 1.268, which corresponds to a p = 0.205. Again the test can not reject the null hypothesis and
oﬀers no support that the shape parameters of the schedule performance are significantly diﬀerent.
6. Conclusions
The analyses rejected the first hypothesis. It showed that projects with very large cost overruns
or schedule delays are not statistical outliers from a diﬀerent population of uncertainty than smaller
overruns. The ’outliers’ are smooth extrapolations of smaller overruns. The analysis found support
for the second hypothesis that the thickness of tails diﬀers between the private and the public
sector. We argued based on prior research that the divide between the public and the private sector
is predominantly cultural more than an actual diﬀerence how projects are managed and planned.
The analysis also found some statistical evidence to support the third hypothesis that benefits
management thins out the tails. Yet, it failed to support the fourth hypothesis that agile delivery
methods have a similar impact. These findings have theoretical and practical implications.
Theoretical implications
This research project set out to bridge the methodological gap in the existing literature. Where,
on one side, case studies documented and analyzed large project failure and, on the other side,
quantitative studies survey and explain project performance by mostly excluding those outliers.
The focus on qualitative methods to understand outliers corresponds to the theoretical stance that
large-scale failures are unique and an idiosyncratic phenomena. This notion is most pronounced
in the literature on crisis management but the notion is also part of process-oriented theories such
as the man-made disasters theory and the theory of escalation of commitment.
Statisticians have argued that what is perceived to be a statistical outlier under one assumed
regime of uncertainty is a ’normal’ or ’non-outlier’ observation in other regimes of uncertainty.
Building on the notion of fat tail distributions, the analysis showed that cost and schedule overruns
of IT projects follow a power law. This result showed that large cost and schedule overruns are not
fundamentally diﬀerent from smaller overruns.
The first theoretical implication of this finding is that projects that suﬀered from large overruns
are not unique. Overruns themselves are not idiosyncratic chance events. They show regular and
stable patterns.
Second, the analysis implies that rejecting outliers or grouping outliers into a cluster of special
observations is statistically unsound. Outliers need to and can be incorporated into analyses. The
findings showed stable patterns in the occurrence of outliers. These patterns can be used to bridge
the divide between qualitative and quantitative studies of outlier projects. Further research is
needed to better understand the generators of uncertainty in projects.
Third, the analysis explored the locus of control and the controllability of large overruns. It
showed that the thickness of tails diﬀers in the public and the private sector. Prior literature has
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argued that both sectors are set apart by a cultural divide not a diﬀerence in how public and private
organizations manage and plan their IT projects. The findings also underline the need for more
research into better understanding not only the diﬀerences in project management in both sectors,
but how they generate and manage uncertainty.
Fourth, the study explored the impact of two practices of project management: benefits man-
agement and agile delivery methodology. Only benefits management showed significantly diﬀer-
ent tails. The findings imply that at least some of the explanatory factors of outliers of cost and
schedule overruns are internal to the organization and controllable. This supports the argument
that large-scale failures of IT projects are not random chance events, a notion which is dominant
in the crisis and disaster management literature.
Additionally, the finding, that benefits management thins out the tail, has implications for the-
ories of the escalation of commitment. The analysis showed that projects that quantified benefits
had thinner tails, in other words fewer and smaller outliers. Escalation of commitment explains
large-scale IT project failures through a string of rational decisions that lead to a dysfunctional
course of action despite negative feedback. The findings showed that framing eﬀects (Kaplan,
2011), particularly framing decisions as not only a trade-oﬀ between cost and schedule but also
benefits, reduces the likelihood and impact of escalation. Prior discussion focussed on framing ef-
fects in terms of gains or losses (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; Brockner et al., 1986; Brockner,
1992), this analysis implies that structural elements also play a role.
Lastly, the research has also shown that the thickness of the tail oﬀers a dependent variable that
is suitable for explanatory analyses. The thickness of the tail of power laws or pareto distributions
is expressed by the exponent alpha. However, one can argue that the value of such a model is
limited for two reasons. Firstly, fitting a tail parameter has limited value in predictive models. A
small change in the parameter value leads to large change in forecasted risk (Taleb, 2013). For
example, the P-80 level of overruns has been recommended as a conservative estimate of risk
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). The P-80 level corresponds to an overrun that in 8 of 10 cases was not exceed.
On the flip side, in 2 out of 10 cases the cost overruns exceeded the P-80 level. The P-80 level
cost contingency required for a distribution with an α of 1.5 is +197%, the same contingency for a
distribution with α of 1.6 is +175%. The small change from 1.5 to 1.6 adds 22 percentage points
of contingency, which is large for purposes of risk predictions.
Secondly, the tail exponent has a statistical error of σ = αˆ−1√n . Directly, following from the
previous point, the width of the confidence interval of an estimate of α = 1.6 is only smaller than
0.1 for samples of 600 observations and above. Thus the ML estimator, even though being the best
available, retains a large error. Again limiting the predictive power of any such model. For the
case in point, the large required sample sizes might explain the failure to reject hypothesis four.
The analysis shows that unless more large-n research into the aspects of project execution is done
research into outliers might be limited.
Practical implications
The most important implication is that cost and schedule risk of IT projects have fat tails. The
fatter the tails the greater the impact of outliers on the center of the distribution (Taleb, 2013). Thus
organizations that steer the performance of their projects on averages alone are blind to outliers
and their impact. The challenger disaster (Vaughan, 1996) has shown that hidden processes slowly
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enlarge the risk accepted by organizations. Measuring performance and managing risks without
problematizing outliers is again one way how organizations hide and accept large risks without
them knowing.
Second, large failures attract journalistic, academic, and popular attention. Despite this at-
tention and fascination failed projects, particularly if large, do not lead to organizational learning
(Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). One reason lies in the framing of failure. Framing a failed project
and its managers as victims to external, random, and idiosyncratic circumstances inhibits learning.
The analysis showed that outliers are neither unique nor freak events. Furthermore, the analysis
demonstrated that to understand, learn, and prevent failure managers need not to look externally
or at large failures alone. Small overruns foreshadow large overruns.
Moreover, the comparison of the private and the public sector made the case for transfer learn-
ing from the private to the public sector. However, more research is needed to understand the
specific diﬀerences between public and private sector project management and how that generates
such diﬀerent populations of uncertainty.
Lastly, the findings showed that benefits management is an important practice to manage un-
certainty. Projects that manage benefits have thinner tails. The finding also underlined the impor-
tance of the front-end process. Benefits management might well be the single biggest deficiency
in project management.
While the results for agile projects were mixed. The average schedule overrun significantly
decreased; yet neither cost nor schedule fat tails were reduced. Agile methods seem to reduce
schedule risk, but neither benefits nor cost risk. On the one hand it shows, quite expectedly, that
agile methods are neither panacea nor silver bullet. However, more research is needed particularly
because of the limited statistical power of smaller sample sizes.
In sum, three important findings emerge: Outliers are more prevalent than previously thought.
They are part of the phenomenon, not a unique random event that should be rejected from quan-
titative studies and can only be analyzed qualitatively. The causes of outliers are at least partially
found to have internal and controllable contributors, particularly the sector, i.e., cultural diﬀer-
ences, and organizational practices, such as benefits management, matter.
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